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TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL MODEL OF CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
The Cultural Implicatr*ons 
Thorsten Hisam and Steven Hampton 
One tool used to increase safety in the aviation industry is a training and operations model called Crew 
Resource Management (CRM). The model's human factors approach to training and operating was 
developed in the United States but has gained acceptance worldwide. Domestic research on CRM in the 
United States is limited and international research is almost nonexistent. Because we do not know the degree 
to which the CRM model developed in the American culture is applicable in other cultures, research is 
needed to verify its level of universality across different cultural norms. 
This paper compares the various components of the CRM model as developed in the United States and 
used worldwide on a theoretical basis. Various cultural models from the classical international management 
theorists are compared to the CRM model as a theoretical test of its applicability across cultures. Significant 
potential weaknesses are discovered in the CRM programs as they are applied cross-culturally. 
Recommendations for possible future resolutions to these weaknesses are presented. 
INTRODUCTION 
Both academics and practitioners concerned with 
aviation safety have embraced CRM as a valuable tool in 
reducing human factor accidents specifically and thereby 
aviation accidents as a whole. CRM programs are 
mandated in the United States by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) and have been adopted by all 
major airlines and regional airlines, as well as by many 
corporate and smaller aircraft operators. CRM's 
significance to aviation safety is supported by academic 
literature, trade journals, aircraft operators, and pilots. Its 
success has been so universal that it is already spilling 
over into related and unrelated industries, including 
aviation maintenance, air traffic control, and medicine. 
Internationally, the aviation community also is embracing 
CRM concepts. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) recommends further regulations to 
facilitate CRM training worldwide (Maurino, 1993). As 
all industries move toward globalization, the aviation 
industry also will continue to globalize. This process will 
continue to increase the cultural diversity in the cockpit 
so that different cultures will affect CRM not only across 
borders, but also within the cockpit. 
The United States leads the world in aviation human 
factors research and the American aviation industry has 
the most developed CRM programs. As aviation 
organizations around the world embrace CRM as a tool 
in reducing human factor causes of aviation accidents, the 
tendency has been to try to adopt the CRM model 
developed in the United States (Eissfeldt, Goeters, 
Hoermann, Maschke, & Schiewe, 1995; Maurino, 1993). 
Worldwide cultural differences, however, affect the 
behavior of pilots. Because CRM attempts to modify 
pilot behavior, it is logical to assume that CRM will have 
different effects in different cultures. The literature refers 
to the United States as the country that is least culture- 
conscious in the world. Few people in the United States 
take an active interest in learning about other countries, 
cultures, and languages (Adler, 1991). This description of 
the United States does not create confidence in the 
universal applicability of the American model of CRM. 
Research is needed to tie cultural models to aviation 
human factors and CRM so that the variability among 
cultures can lead to synergy in the cockpit (Redding & 
Ogilvie, 1984). In addition, research is needed to 
determine the best method for implementing CRM 
concepts across cultures. The need is evident in the 
literature. Swierczek (1988) analyzed the Thai and 
American cultures and found significant differences in 
interactive situations, particularly communications, 
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conflict resolution, and interpersonal relations. These are 
key elements to  CRM and aviation safety. Smith and 
Tayeb (1988) also found differences in leadership styles 
across cultures. Leadership is another key element of 
CRM, and another study found that standard operating 
procedures (SOP'S) are subject to cultural variation. 
SOP'S, widely used in aviation and often considered 
universal, were found to contain definitional diversity and 
a variety of applications by crewrnembers (Degani & 
Wiener, 1991). Pun (1990) tells us that many current 
CRM training programs will not transfer across cultures, 
and Guptara and Murray (1990) argued that CRM 
techniques will be ineffective in some cultures because 
the techniques are predicated on assumptions that lack 
universal validity. Furthermore, almost no research on 
CRM has been done outside the United States (Johnston, 
1993). In fact, the management literature on cultural 
issues rarely addresses Latin American and African 
issues. Emerging nations in these regions have up to 
eight times the human factor error rate than that of most 
industrialized nations (Barnett & Higgins, 1989; Wiener, 
1990). 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the CRM 
model and its components in the light of various cultural 
models found in the management literature. Theoretical 
links are established between cultural models and CRM 
to where and how the present CRM model may apply. 
Cultural constructs are described along their scales of 
variance among cultures. Though specific countries are 
mentioned frequently and an effort is made to compare 
the United States' cultural impact on the CRM model, 
this paper does not attempt to predict the likelihood of 
CRM concepts being successful in any specific culture. 
That is beyond the present scope and a single paper 
could only hope to examine one culture in such detail. 
This paper will address CRM's applicability across known 
cultural scales and will provide recommendations for the 
implementation of CRM on a global scale. 
A brief description of the CRM model precedes the 
discussion of various cultural models from the 
management literature. Each cultural model's theoretical 
impact on  CRM is discussed. Select CRM components 
are also discussed within the boundaries of cultural 
theory. Recommendations are provided to facilitate the 
implementation of CRM programs across cultures to 
create a cultural synergy in the cockpit. 
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
Though formerly limited to the flight crew, CRM 
programs are now designed to spill over into all areas of 
the aviation organization to include, but not be limited 
to, aircraft dispatchers, maintenance technicians, and 
flight attendants. CRM refers to the effective use of all 
available resources. These include human resources, 
hardware, and software. CRM is used to bring the 
human/machine interface and interpersonal activities 
closer to optimization (FAA, 1995). CRM objectives also 
have been reported to influence cockpit actions and pilot 
attitudes while sustaining and improving decision-making 
and overall communications (Foushee, 1982, 1984, 
Helmreich & Hackman, 1984; Johnston, 1993). 
Furthermore, evidence for the connection between CRM 
deficiencies and human error accidents among U.S. 
carriers is supported by Ruffell Smith (1979), Cooper, 
White, and Lauber (1979), Murphy (1980), and Foushee 
and Manos (1981). 
There are various CRM programs among the numerous 
air carriers in the United States and worldwide with 
significant differences among programs. However, certain 
components seem universal. These components were 
published by the FAA as guidelines for Part 121 and Part 
135 air carriers in an advisory circular in 1993 (AC 120- 
51A) and superseded in 1995 by AC 120-51B. Further 
information about the CRM model envisioned by the 
FAA is presented in DOT-VNTSC-FAA-92-8, a report 
titled "Crew Resource Management: An Introductory 
HandbookWy the DOT-FAA Research and 
Developement Service (Driskell & Adams, 1m). This 
paper will use the CRM model as put forth by the FAA 
as the CRM model used in comparison with cultural 
constructs. It is important to note that variations in 
programs exist, however. The FAA model was chosen as 
the most representative of industry norms. 
CRM Components 
CRM programs should include several components as 
curriculum topics. These components are designed to 
change pilot behavior. They consist of the following 
topics and subtopics: 
1. Communication processes and decision behavior 
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a. Briefings 
b. Inquiry/advocacy/assertion 
c. Crew self-critique (decisions and actions) 
d. Conflict resolution 
e. Communications and decision-making 
2. Team-building and maintenance 
a. Leadership/followership 
b. Interpersonal relationships/group climate 
c. Workload management and situational 
awareness 
d. Individual factors/stress reduction (Driskell & 
Adams, 1992; FAA, AC 120-51B) 
CRM recognizes the need for strong technical skills, 
and then augments those skills with soft skills as listed 
above. All of these components are deeply rooted in 
culture and will be discussed in that light later. The 
following are definitions of the CRM terms used above 
and are included for clarification of references to those 
terms in this paper. 
Briefings: Structured communications between 
crewmembers usually preceding a key event such as a 
take-off, approach, or landing, but not limited to those. 
Inquiry, advocacy, and assertion: Crewmember behavior 
that is acceptable at times when a crewmember feels a 
course of action is best, even though there may be 
conflict among crewmembers. They affect interpersonal 
relations, teamwork, and the captain's authority. 
Crew self-critique: The crewrnembers are evaluating 
their decisions and actions themselves so that the skill 
can better transfer from training to flightline activities. 
Conflict resolution: Techniques for resolving 
disagreements among crewmembers. 
Communications: Effective techniques of filtering 
information, transmitting information, and seeking 
information while minimizing biases and barriers. 
Decision-making: Operational models for judgment in 
an effort to involve everyone who can help. This also 
involves the optimum management of informational 
resources. 
Team-building: Improving interpersonal relationships 
and practices. Synergies should be achieved in the group. 
Leadership and followership: Attempts to achieve 
effective leadership by providing the proper balance 
between respect for authority and assertiveness. The 
primary goal for everyone is the safe and efficient 
operation of the aircraft. 
Interpersonal relationships and the group climate: This 
area emphasizes sensitivity to other crewmembers' styles 
and personalities in the hope of maintaining a friendly 
and relaxed tone among crewrnembers. 
Workload management: The proper division of duties 
among crewmembers and the anticipation of 
contingencies. Concepts include preparation, planning, 
vigilance, workload distribution, and distraction 
avoidance. 
Individual factors and stress reduction: This area 
emphasizes the effects of stress and fatigue on the 
performance of flight duties in an attempt to reduce their 
ill effects. 
CRM Characteristics 
CRM is defined by the following characteristics: 
1. CRM is a comprehensive system of applying human 
factors concepts to improve crew performance. 
2. CRM embraces all operational personnel. 
3. CRM can be blended into all forms of aircrew 
training. 
4. CRM concentrates on crewmembers' attitudes and 
behaviors and their impact on safety. 
5. CRM uses the crew as the unit for training. 
6. CRM is training that requires the active participation 
of all crewmembers (FAA, AC 120-51B, 1995). 
Fundamentals of CRM Implementation 
The following practices are recommended for aviation 
organizations planning to implement CRM programs: 
1. Assess the status of the organization before 
implementation. 
2. Get commitment from all managers, starting with 
senior managers. 
3. Customize the program to reflect the nature and 
needs of the organization. 
4. Define the scope of the program. 
5. Communicate the nature and the scope of the 
program before startup. 
6. Institute quality control procedures. 
7. Evaluate and analyze the entire program. 
These recommendations are very similar to 
recommendations commonly made to firms undertaking 
organizational culture shifts to Total Quality 
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Management (TQM) processes. In fact, there are strong 
parallels between CRM and TQM. TQM has been found 
to not be universally applicable across cultures (Kolesar, 
1993). The link between the two concepts leads us to 
believe that CRM also may not be universally applicable 
across cultures. 
CRM and Behavior 
CRM focuses on influencing the behavior of 
participants. The aviation organization uses CRM 
training to create a CRM environment that reinforces the 
desirable crewmember behavior discussed earlier. 
Crewmember behavior is then continually evaluated and 
further reinforced with training based on the evaluation. 
A good CRM program maintains a detailed, quantitative 
database on outcomes assessment, much like TQM 
programs do. A model of the relationship would look 
like this: 
Evaluation 
CRM Training Behavior 
THEORETICAL LINK 
The impact of culture on behavior is great. There are 
many models for evaluating this significance. A simple, 
but universal, model was provided by Adler (1991): 
Culture 
Behayior values 
This paper will create a theoretical link between CRM's 
impact on behavior and cultural effects on behavior, in 
effect creating a model which would look like the 
following: 
Evaluation Culture 
CRM ~Gin inn  Behavior Values 
- 
CRM program Attitudes 
This theoretical model shows that crewmember 
behavior cannot be influenced by a CRM program 
without the consideration of cultural factors. Culture is 
a universal trait in that it exists for everyone. In the 
absence of a CRM program, this model indicates that 
culture will still affect behavior. Obviously, there are 
other influences on behavior that cannot be covered by 
the broad concept we call culture, but those are beyond 
the scope of this paper. We will concern ourselves with 
the impact of culture on crewrnember behavior and the 
implications of culture on CRM programs. 
CULTURE 
There are many cultural models in the conventional 
management literature. All of these models attempt to 
categorize human behavior among a set of scales. Each 
scale has extremes at each end and more moderate 
cultural norms in the middle. Examples of such scales 
include the conceptualization of time and space, low- 
versus high-context communications, uncertainty 
avoidance, and numerous others. We will examine models 
of a selected group and discuss how the behaviors along 
the models' scales may affect CRM as defined above. 
The following discussion begins with a general view of 
cultural scales presented by Hall (1959, 1966, 1976, 
1983). Another overall view of culture was presented by 
Herskovitz (1952) and has been noted in the literature 
many times since. A third model was presented by 
Hofstede (1980a, 1980b, 1983, 1984, 1991). It shifts the 
emphasis of the model to the impact on management and 
organizational behavior. It also provides interesting 
insights into CRM and has been noted in the literature 
in concert with aviation human factors (Johnston, 1993; 
Phelan, 1994). We will examine the CRM model in the 
light of each management model. 
Several components of CRM, including organizational 
synergy, motivation, and decision-making, are explained 
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by cultural researchers in various models. These models 
have been thoroughly tested and are considered mature. 
We will apply the models to CRM. Recommendations for 
practitioners and researchers conclude this paper. 
Hall's Discussion of Cultural Scales 
The cultural scales described by Hall include variances 
in the formalities of relationships, the contexts of 
communications, the concepts of space and time, the 
flows of information, and the processes of action chains. 
Each scale is addressed below in reference to its 
theoretical impact on CRM. The scales are discussed in 
terms of generalities. It is important to note that 
exceptions will exist in all cases, particularly in cultures 
where there are numerous subcultures. 
Hall describes the formalities of relationships in terms 
of fast and slow messages. People in cultures 
characterized by fast messages generally form more 
informal, superficial relationships. In contrast, cultures 
characterized by slow messages foster deeper, long-term 
relationships. Examples of fast-message cultures include 
the United States and Canada. Slow-message cultures 
exist throughout Europe and the Middle East (Hall, 
1983). Fast-message cultures accept the use of 
informalities more than do slow-message cultures; thus, 
the atmosphere in the aircraft cockpit will be different. 
An American crew may be on a first-name basis before 
the end of the first layover, while a European crew may 
fly together for years and continue to communicate more 
formally. These differences will affect the concepts of 
leadership, communications models, and conflict- 
resolution models. 
The context of communications has been scaled among 
cultures to range from low-context cultures to high- 
context cultures. Low-context cultures tend to base most 
of their communications on the words that are spoken, 
while high-context cultures communicate more from 
within and place less emphasis on the actual words (Hall, 
1976). The United States and Germany are examples of 
low-context cultures. Asia and the Middle East, as well as 
some European cultures, are characterized by high- 
context communications (Adler, 1984). The implications 
on  communications, briefings, conflict resolution, and 
teamwork should be obvious. The communication model 
for CRM applies well in the United States, but does not 
take into account the additional variables created by 
high-context communications. 
The concept of space can be divided into the subtopics 
of territoriality (personal space) and the multisensory 
spatial experience. Territoriality refers to the individual's 
tendency to label personal space. Americans and 
Germans, for example, tend to require greater personal 
space than do Latin Americans or Arabs. People of 
cultures that have a higher affinity for territoriality often 
will get uncomfortable when their personal space is 
invaded, a reaction that people of cultures requiring less 
personal space often find insulting (Hall, 1966, 1976). 
The territoriality scale can affect communications, 
relationships, teamwork, leadership, and conflict 
resolution in the CRM model. The multisensory spatial 
experience refers to an individual's openness to 
interruptions when working or communicating. Some 
cultures tend to be very inflexible in this regard, shunning 
any interruption and losing their momentum in the task 
when distracted. Germans and Americans tend to be the 
most inflexible (Hall & Hall, 1990). Other cultures exist 
in a constant state of distraction and thrive on the open 
information flow. Examples include the French and 
Arabs (Hall & Hall, 1990). These differences will affect 
pilots. For example, an American pilot who flies with a 
Saudi crew encounters what he perceives to be confusion 
and lack of organization in the cockpit. The concept of 
a sterile cockpit may be completely different in other 
cultures. 
The concept of time also can be divided into subtopics. 
One cultural scale of time divides cultures into various 
degrees of monochronic or polychronic tendencies. 
Monochronic cultures do one thing at a time, concentrate 
on that job, make deadlines, are low-context 
communicators, are committed to the job, adhere to 
plans, dislike interruptions, emphasize promptness, and 
tend to make short-term relationships. Polychronic 
cultures do many things at once, meet deadlines if 
possible, are high-context communicators, are committed 
to people, change plans often, base promptness on the 
relationship, and build lifetime friendships (Hall & Hall, 
1990). We can see strong parallels with the other cultural 
scales presented. This variability in the perception of 
time will affect CRM's applicability across cultures, 
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because it causes people to view relationships and tasks 
differently. Polychronic cultures (Asia and the Middle 
East, for example) will prioritize their actions around 
people, while monochronic cultures (such as Germany 
and the United States) will prioritize their actions around 
tasks, plans, and deadlines. This variability in priorities 
will affect the applicability of CRM by varying the 
emphasis placed on its components and by varying the 
reasons people do certain things. A second cultural scale 
of time refers to an individual's orientation in viewing 
time. Cultures can be past-oriented (Asia, the Middle 
East, Germany), future-oriented (United States) or 
present-oriented (Latin America). This orientationaffects 
the individual's frame of reference for decision-making 
(Hall, 1983). A German will review the history 
surrounding a certain action, an American will tend to 
predict the action's outcome, and a Latin American will 
assess the action's present feasibility. The implications on 
the CRM component of decision-making and judgment 
are obvious. 
Information flow is affected by Hall's models as well. 
Information does not flow as easily in low-context 
cultures as it does in high-context cultures. Low-context 
communication, such as in Germany and the United 
States, tends to be more focused and controlled, while 
information in a high-context society almost tends to take 
on a life of its own. Information flow is not impeded by 
rules, procedures, or protocol (Hall & Hall, 1990). The 
communication model and the structured briefings called 
for by the CRM model endorsed by the FAA may not 
apply or be necessary in a high-context culture. At the 
very least, we can assume that optimum information flow 
will likely be achieved through a different model. 
Action chains are equally as important in aviation as is 
information flow. Action chains in this sense refer to 
established sequences of procedures. The accurate 
execution of such action chains is critical in the cockpit. 
The use of documented procedures is an essential 
element of CRM and important in workload 
management. Hall and Hall (1990) report that low- 
context cultures tend to be more dependent on action 
chains and procedures and also more prone to errors 
resulting from interruptions. There is a close relationship 
to the multisensory spatial experience discussed earlier. 
Flight crews from the United States and other low- 
context societies will have a higher risk factor related to 
procedural mistakes than will flight crews from high- 
context societies. It is logical to assume that a CRM 
program in a low-context culture should have a higher 
emphasis on procedures to prevent pilot errors. Emphasis 
in a program for high-context communicators may be 
shifted to another area. 
Herskovitz's Five Dimensions of Culture 
Herskovitz presents us with another classical model of 
cultural norms. He breaks cultural differences into five 
dimensions (Herskovitz, 1952): 
1. The material culture 
2. Social institutions 
3. Man and the universe 
4. Aesthetics 
5. Language 
We describe each and address its implication for the 
universal application of the CRM model. 
The concept of the material culture in Herskovitz's 
model refers to the importance of technology and 
economics in a society. Generally, the more industrialized 
a country is, the more importance the material culture 
holds (Herskovitz, 1952). Aviation is heavily impacted by 
technology and economics, but there is no strong, evident 
link between the material-culture concept and the CRM 
model. Aviators, by virtue of their profession, will have 
to embrace technology to a certain degree in every 
culture. Thus, the material-culture effect in a developing 
country may not impact the aviation community as 
heavily as other sectors of the society (agriculture, 
construction, etc.). If there are any variations to the 
universal application of the CRM model resulting from 
this construct, they will most likely impact decision- 
making models. 
The norms surrounding social institutions make up 
Herskovitz's second dimension of culture. He refers to 
the priorities of government, religion, and business in a 
culture. These priorities are reflected in the culture's 
ethics and customs. For example, Asians tend to have 
paternalistic social institutions, American social 
institutions celebrate individualism, and the people of 
India have developed a system of social institutions 
driven largely by nepotism (Herskovitz, 1952). These 
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concepts describe some of the underlying philosophies 
that drive the customs of a culture. They are applicable 
to all areas contained in the CRM model in some way. 
The model developed by the people of an individualistic 
culture, the United States, may require extensive 
modification before it can be exported to Japan, where 
the concepts of team-building, leadership, and 
communication are vastly different. 
Herskovitz calls his third dimension "man and the 
universe." This concept refers to how people view 
themselves in the spiritual world, and encompasses 
religion and superstition. In some countries, spiritual 
beliefs influence behavior greatly. Religion can affect all 
institutions and even the law. Numerous examples exist 
in Asia and the Middle East. In other countries, such as 
the United States and most of Europe, religion and 
superstition play a much smaller role, and may even be 
specifically separated from the institutions of government 
and law. The dimension of "man and the universen affects 
the causes of behavior and thereby some of the strongest 
facets of culture. Large differences between cultures will 
affect the CRM model by changing the motivations and 
reasons for desired behaviors. 
Aesthetics is the fourth dimension of culture in the 
model. This cultural concept refers to art, literature, 
music, and drama. Herskovitz states that this dimension 
overlaps slightly with "man and the universen (1952, p. 
17). Differences between cultures are great when viewed 
through the eyes of an artist or art historian, but are not 
very significant in their effect on workplace behavior. 
There is an impact on language that has to be considered 
for the CRM model, but when compared to the other 
dimensions, the significance is reduced. 
The fifth dimension reported by Herskovitz is language. 
It overlaps with the "man and the universe" and aesthetics 
dimensions. The language concept in the model includes 
the words used, the implications beyond the words, and 
body language. Once again great differences exist cross- 
culturally. High-context cultures, such as the Chinese, 
place much more emphasis on the the unspoken word 
than low-context cultures do. In many cases the unspoken 
word carries significantly more weight than the spoken 
word. The unspoken word can come in the form of a 
gesture, a look, or a more subtle implication, which often 
goes unnoticed to Westerners. A Chinese crewmember, 
when asked by the captain whether he understands an 
instruction, is most likely to say "yesn even if he did not 
understand. Saying "no" might cause the captain to lose 
face, because it implies that the instruction was not clear. 
Such a situation is much less likely in the United States 
and significantly affects inquiry, assertion, briefings, and 
conflict resolution. The dimension of language will 
impact the universal application of the CRM model 
greatly. 
Four out of five dimensions in Herskovitz's model 
should affect the CRM model in cross-cultural situations. 
Each dimension should be researched thoroughly to 
determine the applicability of CRM concepts and how 
changes may optimize the model. 
Hofstede's Model 
Hofstede presents four scales of culture and applies 
them specifically to organizational behavior. His research 
was among the most extensive ever conducted in 
international organizational behavior and has been used 
often in published research. 
Hofstede's four cultural scales are: 
1. Individualism/collectivism 
2. Power distance 
3. Uncertainty avoidance 
4. MasculinityJfemininity (Hofstede, 1980a) 
The scale identified by individualism and collectivism is 
concerned with how people define themselves. 
Individualism exists when people define themselves as 
individuals. Examples include the United States and 
Western Europe. Of all the countries in Hofstede's 
sample, 50 countries in total, the United States and 
Australia were tied for having the most individualistic 
cultural trends. Behavior in individualistic cultures is 
controlled through internal pressures such as guilt 
(Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a). Collectivism exists in 
cultures characterized by tight social frameworks in which 
people distinguish between groups and define themselves 
through the group. Examples include Japan and most of 
Asia. Determinism characterizes collectivist cultures, 
where the will of the group determines the members' 
beliefs and behaviors. Behavior is controlled through 
external, societal pressure such as shame (Adler, 1991; 
Hofstede, 1980a). CRM in the air-carrier setting is 
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designed for the group. The American CRM model 
includes components that are designed to overcome the 
individualistic tendencies in the American culture. Such 
components include teamwork, leadership, followership, 
and conflict-resolution training. Evidence from Hofstede's 
research would indicate that members of collectivist 
cultures might not need such training. They may already 
be better prepared to act as a team. On the other hand, 
they may also be more susceptible to groupthink and 
need more training in decision-making, inqui~y, and 
assertion. The CRM training model would once again 
have to be adapted. 
Hofstede's power distance scale measures the extent to 
which less powerful members of organizations accept the 
unequal distribution of power. In low-power distance 
societies, such as Israel, Denmark, and Austria, 
employees are expected to bypass their boss to get the 
job done. High power distance cultures, such as India and 
Venezuela, consider such behavior to be insubordination 
(Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a). The United States falls 
toward the low end of this scale, but not in the extreme 
(Hofstede, 1980b). One recent article reports that power 
distance is the scale in Hofstede's model that will affect 
CRM behaviors the most (Phelan, 1994). Concepts such 
as the captain's authority, inquiry, assertion, and conflict 
resolution will certainly be affected. Variations in 
communication are also likely. The United States' 
position toward the middle of the scale is encouraging for 
the applicability of some of the CRM model, however. 
Uncertainty avoidance is Hofstede's third scale. It refers 
to the extent to which people in a culture will accept 
ambiguous situations and the extent to which they will 
avoid such situations through formal rules and the 
rejection of deviant ideas. Hofstede was primarily 
referring to the certainty of employment and the concept 
of lifetime employment in high uncertainty avoidance 
countries (Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a). It is not clear 
whether the scale can be extended into the cockpit 
management setting, but the literature does include some 
suggestions that it can (Phelan, 1994). Once again, the 
United States falls toward the center of the scale 
(Hofstede, 1980b). One might conclude that high 
uncertainty avoidance societies may be more likely to 
establish strict procedures for pilots and may depend 
more heavily on standardization. Low uncertainty 
avoidance cultures might be more likely to allow 
variances from procedures in their training. The CRM 
model emphasizes the use of standardized procedures and 
sound decision-making in the event that a situation is not 
covered by the policies. The United States' position in 
the middle of the scale and the CRM model seem to 
indicate that Hofstede's scale may apply t o  the cockpit, 
because the model suggests a compromise position in 
concert with the cultural scale. 
Hofstede calls his fourth cultural scale 
masculinitylfemininity. In short, he reports that masculine 
societies define gender roles more rigidly than do 
feminine societies. The Scandinavian countries are 
reported to be the most feminine, Japan and Australia 
the most masculine, and the United States slightly 
masculine among Hofstede's sample (Adler, 1991; 
Hofstede, 1980a). The Middle East was not well- 
represented in Hofstede's study, but reports of culturally 
based behavior in this region also suggest strong 
masculinity in the society. The CRM model is gender- 
neutral. The model even discourages gender bias through 
its emphasis on teamwork Every crewmember is valued, 
regardless of gender. In Hofstede's model, the CRM t 
model would be defined as highly feminine. This leads us 
to believe that the masculinitylfemininity scale differences 
among cultures should not affect the CRM model's 
applicability in feminist to slightly masculine cultures. It 
would have to be tested in a more masculine 
environment and may require some modification there. 
Additional reinforcement of CRM components may be 
necessary in a very masculine culture to make a male 
captain respect the input from a female first officer, for 
example. 
Organizational Synergy and Cultural Diversity 
Synergistic effects are more of a goal of CRM than a 
component. The literature addresses cultural synergy by 
identifying advantages and disadvantages of 
multiculturalism. 
Culturally synergistic advantages to organizational 
behavior include: 
1. Expanding meanings 
a. Multiple perspectives 
b. Greater openness to new ideas 
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c. Multiple interpretations 
2. Expanding alternatives 
a. Increasing creativity 
b. Increasing flexibility 
c. Improving problem-solving skills 




Disadvantages of cultural diversity to organizational 
behavior include: 




2. Communications become more difficult 
a. Miscommunication 
b. Often hard to reach a single agreement 
3. Hard to agree on specific actions 
4. Mistrust among members (Adler, 1991) 
All the items reported by Adler will impact CRM. The 
advantages represent exactly what is sought through the 
CRM model: better problem-solving through open 
communication, reflecting various viewpoints and all of 
the available information. The disadvantages represent 
difficulties in the same areas, decision-making and 
communication. The challenge for CRM practitioners 
and teachers is to develop a multicultural model that 
addresses this potential conflict in a multicultural crew. 
The model and the training can either greatly enhance 
decision-making and communication in a culturally 
diverse cockpit or a faulty application of the CRM model 
may cause both to deteriorate. Cultural synergy is 
reported to be attained when an organizational behavior 
model, such as the CRM model, is based on, but not 
limited to, the cultures involved and accepted by all the 
participants (Burke & Goodstein, 1980). This would 
suggest changes for the CRM model across cultures or 
one CRM model with significant cultural flexibility built 
in. 
Kovach reported in his research that culturally diverse 
teams working to solve technical problems will be either 
highly effective or highly ineffective. Few multicultural 
teams performed on an average level (Kovach, in Adler, 
1991). Kovach found that the teams that performed at 
the highest levels were engaged in non-routine tasks that 
required innovation. Those engaged in routine tasks were 
less effective. This would suggest the need for 
components in the CRM model to address multicultural 
effectiveness during the 99 percent of flight time spent in 
routine operations. Kovach also reported that the 
effective teams had the following characteristics: 
1. Recognized differences 
2. Members selected on ability 
3. Mutual respect 
4. Equal power 
5. Superordinate goal 
Ineffective teams had other characteristics: 
1. Ignored differences 
2. Members selected on basis of ethnicity 
3. Ethnocentrism 
4. Cultural dominance 
5. Individual goals 
These findings would suggest a possible framework for 
a component of a multicultural CRM model that 
addresses the challenges of diversity in a variety of 
situations. 
Motivation Across Cultures 
Motivation is extremely important to the understanding 
of the training concepts and the behavior concepts of 
CRM. Because motivation guides behavior, the actions 
and attitudes of flight crewmembers will be dependent on 
how they are motivated to act. Training involves learning, 
which is defined as a change in behavior, and is therefore 
equally dependent on motivational concepts. It appears 
that without the proper motivational tools, a CRM 
program will fail. Flight crews cannot be forced into a 
CRM model. Crews have to embrace the concept. This is 
the key to a successful program. 
We will examine the motivation theories presented by 
four prominent authors: Maslow, McClelland, Herzberg, 
and Vroom. Each theorist's contribution to motivational 
theory will be described and its applicability across 
cultures analyzed. 
Maslow presents a hierarchy of needs that motivate 
behavior. Maslow's theory is based on Americans and 
describes individualistic needs as motivators (Adler, 1991; 
Maslow, 1943). While the individual dominates the 
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American culture, community dominates the cultures of 
many societies, including those of Asia and eastern Africa 
(Adler, 1991). Thus, Maslow's need hierarchy is weak 
across cultures and will not support a cross-cultural CRM 
model. 
McClelland suggests three motives for workers: 
achievement, power, and affiliation (McClelland, 1961). 
His motivational model has been shown to be relatively 
robust across cultures, but not universal (Adler, 1991). 
Although it has a wider scope of application, it is not 
comprehensive enough to provide a solid base for an 
international CRM model. It could, however, serve as 
part of a base model for motivation in cross-cultural 
CRM. 
Herzberg's two-factor theory suggested that the 
extrinsic factors surrounding the work environment have 
the power to demotivate individuals, while the intrinsic 
factors within the job itself can motivate behavior 
(Herzberg, 1%8). Herzberg's theory also was developed 
in the United States and has been tested cross-culturally 
without replication (Adler, 1991). In other words, 
Herzberg's two-factor theory does not hold up cross- 
culturally. 
Therefore, CRM programs using solely intrinsic 
motivators will not be applicable in all cultures. The 
CRM model tested in this paper was developed largely 
around intrinsic motivators, such as a safer flying 
environment and a more efficient flight crew. 
Vroom's expectancy theory claims that people are 
motivated by the expectation that their actions will 
produce results. Motivation is the result of the likelihood 
that the action will produce the desired result combined 
with the perceived value of that result (Vroom, 1%4). 
The theory can be expressed as M=E*V, where M 
represents motivation, E represents the likelihood of the 
desirable outcome, and V represents the individual's 
perceived value of that outcome. Although his concept 
has been found to be highly applicable across cultures 
(Adler, 1991), i t  is also important to note that rewards 
vary greatly across cultures. The rewards of the CRM 
model developed in the United States are intrinsic in 
nature and have been shown, in the light of Herzberg's 
work, to have varying degrees of perceived value cross- 
culturally. 
These four theorists are those most often cited in 
motivational research in the United States. Their 
contributions do not, however, seem to apply consistently 
across cultures. Motivation appears to be culture-bound. 
It is logical to assume that motivational components of 
a cross-cultural CRM model will have to be flexible 
enough to vary between applications. 
Decision-Making Across Cultures 
Decision-making is a large component of CRM and 
pilot training in general. Training programs attempt to 
instill the proper judgment skills in a flight crewrnember 
so that decisions will most likely be correct. Decision- 
making involves five basic steps: problem recognition, 
information-gathering, alternatives development, choice, 
and implementation. 
Problem recognition varies across cultures because of 
the varying concepts of destiny. Some cultures, including 
some of those based on Islam, believe that some 
situations should be accepted, rather than changed. 
Americans are more self-reliant and individualistic. 
Hence, the CRM model for decision-making accepts all 
problems as changeable. 
Information-gathering varies because some cultures 
search for information through ideas and possibilities, 
while Americans generally search for facts. The decision- 
making models in American CRM programs are based on 
factual data-gathering. 
Some cultures develop alternatives by searching 
through the past and what has been, while others look 
toward the future and what can be. Past-oriented 
cultures, for example, tend to believe that adults cannot 
change. This is a strong obstacle to CRM 
implementation. The United States is generally a future- 
oriented culture. 
The choice of decision can rest with the individual or 
with the group. The CRM model tries to shift the 
individualistic approach in the United States to more of 
a group effort. This situation should apply cross- 
culturally, then, though some cultures will need less 
emphasis. The present emphasis in the CRM model is to 
slow down the decision-making process, which may not 
be necessary in communal cultures. The decision rule 
also varies across cultures. Americans and other 
individualistic cultures use decision rules testing for 
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"true" versus "false."Some other societies apply decision 
rules testing for "good" or "bad." The CRM model looks 
for "true" or "false" and may require further definition or 
flexibility in this area. 
The implementation of decisions also varies between 
individualistic and communal cultures. The principal 
difference is the speed of implementation. Because the 
implementation of aeronautical decisions for a flight crew 
would more than likely all be relatively quick, this 
variation across cultures should not affect the CRM 
model greatly, if at all. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears that most cultural models, when applied to 
the present CRM model, do not support its applicability 
across cultures. Certain key elements addressed in CRM 
have a wide range of behaviors cross-culturally. 
Particularly the areas of interpersonal communication, 
leadership, and group dynamics varied greatly along the 
cultural scales reported by various theorists. These areas 
are key elements of any aviation human factors (CRM) 
program, as well as any aviation safety program in a crew 
environment. Since these elements are addressed in the 
CRM model from the American culture's perspective, we 
must conclude that the CRM model's universality 
worldwide is highly questionable. To complicate matters, 
most theorists placed the American culture near one 
extreme end of the cultural behavior scale. This suggests 
that the .American CRM model's applicability in certain 
cultures at the other end of the scale is even more 
unlikely. The cultural models indicate that the CRM 
model would have to be modified for different cultures, 
particularly if near-optimum effects on the safety of flight 
are desired. Of course, they always are. 
Some airlines operating in societies outside the West- 
ern cultures have decided to adopt the CRM principles 
from the American model, planning to adjust their 
cultural norms to the foreign model. No research is 
available to indicate the effectiveness of this strategy, but, 
at least in theory, we suggest that better results would be 
obtained from adapting the CRM training and operating 
programs to the cultural norms. The report of Burke and 
Goodstein (1980) on cultural synergy supports this 
assertion. 
Research is needed to empirically test the assertions of 
this work. The effectiveness of the CRM model in 
cultures other than the United States should be tested. 
The objectives of the research would include finding a 
cultural scale for pilot and crew behaviors to determine 
how far along the scale certain CRM components would 
apply. Those components most critical to the safety of 
flight in each culture should be found before 
practitioners can develop training and operating 
programs to address them. Critical factor areas should 
then be measured to find both the desired behavior and 
the general, present behavior in that culture. Only then 
can program specifics be developed. Various cross- 
cultural approaches to pilot training should be tested 
individually as to their effectiveness. 
Although a universal model of CRM appears unlikely, 
a worldwide model with basic principles and individual 
component programs can certainly be developed through 
future efforts. Practitioners and theorists should agree on 
basic guiding principles for the programs and individual 
component modules should be developed to address the 
critical factor areas for the safety of flight. Individual 
component modules should include specific approaches 
for specific cu1tures.O 
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